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Bias in the tone of forward-looking narratives
Thomas Schleicher and Martin Walker*
Abstract –We extend the prior literature on biased disclosure decisions by examining whether, when and howmanagers bias
the tone of forward-looking narratives. In order to measure tone we employ techniques of manual content analysis and we
aggregate positive, neutral and negative statements into an overall measure of tone.We then analyse the frequency of positive
and negative statements for firms with large impending year-on-year changes in sales and operating profit margin, and we
regress tone cross-sectionally on four managerial incentive variables that are unrelated to the private signal about future
trading, namely loss status, sign of earnings change, business risk, and the existence of an analyst earnings forecast.
We find that firms with large impending performance declines bias the tone in the outlook section upwards. Also, we find
that loss firms, risky firms and firms with an analyst earnings forecast provide a more positive tone, while firms with an
earnings decline provide a more negative tone. Finally, we observe that for a majority of our managerial incentive variables
the main vehicle of biasing the tone is to change the number of negative statements, not the number of positive statements.
Overall, our findings are difficult to reconcile with predictions from signalling models, but they are consistent with the
alternative view of impression management. Our results have policy implications. In particular, they suggest that there is a
need to reconsider the current largely unregulated nature of forward-looking narratives.
Keywords: forward-looking; narratives; tone; bias; impression management; content analysis
1. Introduction
We extend the prior literature on biased disclosure
decisions by focusing on the tone of forward-
looking narratives. We focus on forward-looking
narratives because the existing evidence on the
usefulness, predictive value, and value-relevance is
stronger for forward-looking narratives than for
backward-looking narratives (e.g. Bryan, 1997;
Schleicher and Walker, 1999; Clarkson et al.,
1999). This suggests that managers with a willing-
ness to engage in impression management are likely
to target forward-looking statements. Thus, our
study differs from prior research on impression
management in narratives in that we focus exclu-
sively on forward-looking disclosures.
At the same time we define forward-looking
disclosures more widely than management earnings
forecast studies (e.g. McNichols, 1989; Jelic et al.,
1998; McConomy, 1998; Rogers and Stocken,
2005). In particular, we include all types of
forward-looking statements, including qualitative
and non-earnings-related statements. We believe
such a focus is justified for two reasons. First, in the
UK information on current and future trading is
typically made through qualitative narratives, not
through quantitative management earnings fore-
casts. For example, Brennan (1999: 884) observes
that ‘forecasts are rarely disclosed by UK manage-
ment except in new share issue prospectuses and
during takeover bids’. Given the dominance of
qualitative trading statements over hard earnings
forecasts it is surprising how little research has been
done on these statements. Second, the qualitative
nature of forward-looking narratives and their
frequent focus on soft and non-earnings-related
topics makes it much harder for outsiders to
effectively monitor the accuracy of these state-
ments. Evidence in Rogers and Stocken (2005)
suggests that an inability to monitor ex post
increases the likelihood of ex ante manipulation.
We investigate whether, when and howmanagers
bias the tone of forward-looking narratives. For that
we use techniques of manual content analysis and
we focus on the annual report outlook section, a
paragraph of forward-looking statements that is
typically located at the end of the Chairman’s
Statement. For each forward-looking statement we
determine the tone of the underlying message and
we aggregate positive, neutral and negative state-
ments into an overall measure of tone. The tone of
forward-looking narratives is our proxy for forecast
news.
We make the following observations when
analysing a sample of annual reports with large
impending year-on-year changes in sales growth
rate and operating profit margin. First, firms with
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large impending decreases use positive statements
significantly more than negative statements. This is
consistent with firms biasing the tone of outlook
statements upwards. Second, when we estimate the
determinants of tone we find that managerial
incentives unrelated to future trading dominate our
findings. In particular, we find that managers lower
the tone if previous year’s earnings decline and they
increase the tone if previous year’s earnings are
negative. Also, we find that risky firms and firms
with an analyst earnings forecast significantly
increase the tone in the outlook section. These
four observations are difficult to reconcile with
predictions from signalling models, but they are
consistent with the alternative view of impression
management.
Investigating whether, when and how managers
bias the tone of forward-looking annual report
narratives is an important research issue as prior
studies demonstrate that such narratives are con-
sidered useful by professional analysts
(e.g. Clarkson et al., 1999) and that they are used
by investors in setting market prices (e.g. Bryan,
1997; Hussainey et al., 2003). Thus, manipulating
the news content of forward-looking annual report
narratives has the potential to affect analyst views
and market values.
Our findings have implications for accounting
policy-makers. In particular, our results question the
rationale of leaving forward-looking annual report
narratives largely unregulated and unaudited. For
example, while the Accounting Standards Board
(ASB) (1993, 2006) is encouraging firms to include
forward-looking narrative information in the
Operating and Financial Review, the Reporting
Statement is a formulation of best practice and not
an enforceable accounting standard. Also, the UK
Auditing Practices Board (APB) applies
International Standards on Auditing in requiring
the auditor to read other information to identify
material inconsistencies with the audited financial
statements. If the auditor becomes aware of any
apparent misstatements or identifies any material
inconsistencies, the auditor should seek to resolve
them (APB, 2004, para. 2 and 2-1). This require-
ment is vague and difficult to act upon as financial
statements and forward-looking narratives relate to
different time periods. Our findings of biased
disclosure decisions suggest that there is a need
to reconsider the current regulatory regime for
forward-looking narratives.
The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows. The next section reviews the literature and
derives hypotheses. Section 3 describes our
research design, including sample selection, content
analysis, and hypotheses testing. Our results are
reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypothesis
development
A large number of theoretical papers examine
incentives for managers to disclose private infor-
mation to outside parties. Early studies like
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), for
example, assume that managers face incentives
that induce them to act in the best interest of the
firm’s current owners and that such managers
cannot pre-commit to disclose all value-relevant
information, regardless of whether this information
is good or bad. In other words, managers decide
whether or not to disclose the value-relevant
information only after they have learned the value
of the signal and in making their disclosure decision
they bear in mind the effect of the disclosure on the
wealth of current shareholders (Walker, 1997).
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) then predict
that managers truthfully disclose all value-relevant
information except in a situation where the manager
receives the worst possible signal.
Since the above ‘full disclosure’ principle is often
viewed as not being empirically descriptive subse-
quent analytical papers have added to the model a
cost of disclosure (where this cost of disclosure is
generally viewed as a proprietary cost of providing
sensitive information to competitors) (Verrecchia,
1983). Other models have added uncertainty
regarding whether or not managers have private
information to disclose (Dye, 1985; Jung and
Kwon, 1988). Both ‘costly disclosure’ and ‘lack of
information’ models predict a separating equilib-
rium: firms with relatively good news disclose
while all other firms remain silent (Miller, 2002).
Another stream of the analytical literature studies
the effect of litigation liability by imposing a cost
for non-disclosure of bad news as well as for good
news disclosures that turn out ex post to be overly
optimistic (Trueman, 1997; Hughes and Sankar,
1997). The resultingmodels predict that the value of
the disclosed signal varies with the magnitude of the
expected cost of litigation.When expected litigation
costs are large managers have an incentive to err on
the side of caution and hence they will tend to
withhold good news while also disclosing bad
news.
While US-style disclosure-related litigation is
virtually non-existent in a UK context, the model
predictions might still apply to a UK study if one
interprets the cost of surprising the stock market
more widely. For example, arguments and evidence
in Skinner (1994) and Graham et al. (2005) suggest
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 21/7/2010 04 ABR Schleicher.3d Page 372 of 390
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that the reputational damage to the firm is by far
greater for negative earnings surprises than for
positive earnings surprises. This asymmetric loss in
reputation can translate into a reduction in liquidity
and share price and – following on from this – into a
reduction in executive remuneration andmanagerial
job security.
While the insights provided by the analytical
literature are helpful, the models are generally silent
on the nature of the value-relevant signal. However,
a large impending year-on-year increase in sales and
operating profit margin can be viewed as a ‘good’
news signal while a large impending decrease can
be viewed as a ‘bad’ news signal. Furthermore, the
fact that stock market participants express share
prices in multiples of one-year-ahead sales and
profit (e.g. Palepu et al., 2003) suggests that this
signal is value-relevant. In the remainder of the
paper we refer to firms with large impending
increases (decreases) in sales and operating profit
margins as UP (DOWN) firms. Our UP (DOWN)
firms report, in the upcoming financial year, a
median sales growth rate of 30.8 (–12.5)% and a
median change in operating profit margin of 4.0
(–5.9) percentage points.
Below we begin our empirical investigation by
analysing the number of positive and negative
statements per annual report outlook section. The
above theoretical models suggest that UP firm
managers will want to disclose their positive
expectations so as to maximise current market
value. In particular, a large impending performance
increase means that managers have little incentive
to claim lack of information. Also, the sheer size of
the impending performance change means that
outlook statements are unlikely to turn out inaccur-
ate ex post, even in cases where unforeseen events
create a negative ‘wedge’ between expected and
actual outcome. Thus, for UP firms there is little
need to err on the side of caution by withholding
positive statements and disclosing negative state-
ments. These arguments yield our first hypothesis:
H1: For UP firms the number of positive state-
ments exceeds the number of negative state-
ments and the overall tone is positive.
The predictions for DOWN firms are – to some
extent – dependent on the precise theoretical model.
If we interpret our DOWN firms as having the worst
possible news, then Grossman (1981) and Milgrom
(1981) predict silence. Otherwise these models
predict that DOWN firms truthfully announce the
decline in sales and operating profit margin so as to
screen themselves out from firms that have even
worse news to report (like bankruptcy, for
example). The ‘costly disclosure’ models and the
‘lack of information’ models unambiguously pre-
dict silence, while the ‘asymmetric loss function’
argument predicts a tendency to disclose bad news.
Overall, therefore, it is not clear from the signalling
literature whether DOWN firms disclose. However,
if they do disclose, then the negative statements
should clearly outnumber positive statements,
especially because the sheer size of the impending
decline makes it very unlikely that many DOWN
firms had indeed expected good news at the start of
the year. Taking into account that the precise
prediction depends to some extent on the under-
lying model we only predict that:
H2: For DOWN firms the number of positive
statements does not exceed the number of
negative statements and the overall tone is not
positive.
The predictions in H1 and H2 are based on
signalling models. These models assume that
managerial interests are perfectly aligned with the
interests of current owners and that managerial
disclosures are always truthful. An alternative point
of view is based on agency theory which stresses the
possibility of conflicts between managers and
owners and where managers are assumed to act in
their own best interest, not necessarily in the
owners’ best interest.
A seminal paper in the agency cost literature is
that by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They model
investment decisions, not disclosure decisions, but
the principal idea behind their model is still relevant
to our paper. In particular, Jensen and Meckling
(1976) specify managers’ personal utility as increas-
ing in private consumption of corporate resources
and as decreasing in the level of effort that they put
into managing the firm. Their model then predicts
that, whenever a firm’s outside ownership stake is
non-zero, managers choose an effort level that is too
low and they spend too many corporate resources
on activities that generate only personal utility.
While the agency model in Jensen and Meckling
(1976) deals with investment, not disclosure, it is
not difficult to ‘translate’ the model predictions into
a disclosure setting: If managers are prepared to
exploit the unobservability of the managerial effort
in order to ‘shirk’, then, clearly, they can also be
expected to exploit the unobservability of the
private signal about future trading in order to
misrepresent a firm’s trading prospect. The argu-
ments in Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that
they will do so whenever they personally gain from
such a misrepresentation.
The idea that managers use their discretion over
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 21/7/2010 04 ABR Schleicher.3d Page 373 of 390
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corporate disclosures opportunistically to their own
personal benefit is central to the impression man-
agement literature. For example, Clatworthy and
Jones (2001: 311) define impression management
as an attempt ‘to control and manipulate the
impression conveyed to users of accounting infor-
mation’ while Yuthas et al. (2002: 142) regard
impression management as a vehicle to ‘strategic-
ally . . . manipulate the perceptions and decisions of
stakeholders’. In most empirical settings impression
management would be expected to manifest itself
through a positive disclosure bias as managers hope
that the presentation of the firm in the best possible
light leads to increased remuneration and job
security (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003).
Empirically, impression management has been
documented across a wide spectrum of accounting
research issues, including the management of
bottom-line earnings (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006),
the selective disclosure and calculation of pro-
forma earnings (e.g. Walker and Louvari, 2003;
Johnson and Schwartz, 2005), the use of prior-
period benchmarks (e.g. Schrand and Walther,
2000), and the presentation of graphs and pictures
in the annual report (e.g. Beattie and Jones, 1992).
In terms of narratives, impression management
studies have focused on reading ease manipulations
(e.g. Courtis, 2004), thematic manipulations
(e.g. Clatworthy and Jones, 2003) and one-sided
performance attributions (e.g. Bettman and Weitz,
1983). For example, Clatworthy and Jones (2003)
focus on the Chairman’s Statement of 100 UK firms
with extreme changes in pre-tax profits and examine
whether firms with improving and declining per-
formance in the year under review report good and
bad news in a different way. Their findings suggest
that both groups tend to dwell on the positive
aspects of their performance and that both groups
take credit for the good news themselves while
blaming external factors for the bad news. This
leads to the conclusion that managers use (pre-
dominately) backward-looking narratives in a
biased and self-serving way. Evidence of a positive
reporting bias is also documented in Rutherford
(2005) for the Operating and Financial Review, in
Guillamon-Saorin (2006) for press releases, and in
Lang and Lundholm (2000) for firms with an
imminent public offering of new equity. Finally, the
evidence of a bias in management earnings fore-
casts is mixed. For example, Rogers and Stocken
(2005) find that managers not only bias earnings
forecasts in a self-serving way, but also that they are
more likely to bias their forecasts when it is more
difficult for investors to detect that they have
misrepresented their information. This contrasts
with the earlier findings in McNichols (1989) who
obtains only weak evidence of bias in management
earnings forecasts.1
It is instructive to reconsider the signalling-based
predictions in H1 and H2 in the light of self-serving
behaviour. For example, as far as UP firms are
concerned, agency theory and impression manage-
ment make the same prediction as signalling
models. In particular, managers personally benefit
from truthfully revealing their positive expectations
about the future. This is true because the anticipated
rise in market value leads to a higher stock-based
compensation and a lower risk of takeover-related
dismissal. In contrast, for DOWN firms the predic-
tions based on signalling models and self-serving
behaviour differ. In particular, agency theory and
impression management predict a tendency to bias
the tone of forward-looking statements upwards.
Not only can a positive tone delay the risk of
dismissal, but there is even a small chance that
managers might be able to turn things around before
the end of the financial year.
We test H1 and H2 by calculating the difference
between positive and negative statements per
annual report outlook section and by testing
whether the mean and median difference is signifi-
cant. However, while such a test is a useful starting
point, we also recognise that these tests might well
lack the necessary power to detect biased disclo-
sures decisions. In particular, comparing the pre-
dictions from signalling models with those based on
self-serving behaviour suggests that the scenario
underlying H1 is too weak to provide a strong test of
opportunistic behaviour. This is true because there
is no conflict between the managerial incentive to
disclose good news and the real underlying outlook.
Thus, one could argue that there is little reason for
UP firm managers not to report a positive tone.
In order to provide a different angle to our
analysis – especially as far as UP firms are
concerned – we subsequently make two changes
to the research design. First, we consider a number
of additional disclosure incentives which are unre-
lated to the value of the privately observed signal
about future trading. Second, we exploit cross-
sectional variations in tone within our two sub-
samples so as to capture more subtle changes in the
number of positive and negative statements. Such
subtle changes might well go unnoticed in simple
tests of means and medians.
Thus, in the second part of our paper we regress
the firm’s tone on a number of additional managerial
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 21/7/2010 04 ABR Schleicher.3d Page 374 of 390
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incentive variables. These are (a) loss status, (b)
reduction in earnings, (c) business risk, and (d) the
existence of an analyst earnings forecast. Note that
none of these variables is related to the value of the
private signal about future trading. Thus, in a
signalling context these four variables are not
expected to affect the tone of forward-looking
narratives. However, if managers act in their own
personal interest, then the correlations between tone
and these four variables might well be non-zero.
The following paragraphs discuss this possibility in
more detail.
A characteristic feature of trading statements in
the annual report outlook section is that they are
released together with the result for the previous
financial year. This increases the likelihood that the
previous year’s trading – in addition to future
trading – influences a manager’s disclosure deci-
sion. This is true because a disappointing trading
result for the year under review is likely to impose
costs on the manager that are quite similar to those
associated with a negative trading outlook.
In order to mitigate these costs, managers might
be tempted to bias the tone in forward-looking
statements. In particular, they could issue optimistic
disclosures in an attempt to offset the negative job
market repercussions associated with a disappoint-
ing result. In order to examine whether last year’s
financial result affects a manager’s choice of tone,
we consider two types of disappointments: the
incidence of (a) a loss and (b) a decline in earnings.
A large body of empirical research examines the
tactics that are employed by managers to avoid the
reporting of a loss (e.g. Walker and Louvari, 2003).
The overall picture that emerges from these studies
suggests that managers regard the reporting of a
negative earnings number as a major disappoint-
ment that should be avoided if at all possible. This is
understandable given that a loss that is perceived by
outsiders to be permanent calls into question the
competence of the management team and the
general viability of the firm as a going concern.
Our third hypothesis deals with a scenario where
a loss has not been avoided. We argue that in such a
situation the management team’s main concern
must be to convince investors that its strategy is still
working and that investors should continue to
employ managers whose strategy will yield some
positive rewards in the future. Thus, we predict that
a loss firm’s emphasis is on communicating the
firm’s positive prospects so as to prevent investors
from extrapolating the current loss into the future.
Note that this situation is very different from that of
profit firms. For a profit firm the financial result
already shows that the firm is managed compe-
tently. Thus, a manager of a profit firm has less need
to communicate a firm’s positive prospects through
forward-looking statements. This yields our third
hypothesis:
H3: Loss firms report a more positive tone than
profit firms.
The second disappointment we consider relates to a
reduction in earnings. A lower profit can lead to a
decline in managerial remuneration (Matsunaga and
Park, 2001), reduced job security (Puffer and
Weintrop, 1991) and a loss in managerial disclosure
reputation (Matsumoto, 2002). If a concern about
short-term job market repercussions dominates,
then one might expect disclosures to be more
positive. Otherwise, if managers are more con-
cerned about not negatively surprising outsiders in
future years, then disclosures should be less posi-
tive. We would expect the latter concern to be
particularly pronounced if the tone in last year’s
outlook section was typically positive and if the
costs associated with a second straight disappoint-
ment are larger than usual. In particular, one might
expect the damage to a manager’s reputation to be
large if investors interpret a second straight disap-
pointment as evidence that the management team is
either dishonest or incompetent. Given that ex ante
it is not entirely clear which concern dominates, we
formulate the fourth hypothesis as a non-directional
forecast:
H4: The tone reported by managers is unaffected
by the sign of previous year’s earnings change.
The impression management literature suggests that
most managers will try to present the firm in the best
possible light. However, Rogers and Stocken
(2005) argue that, as far as forward-looking disclo-
sures are concerned, managers are constrained
because outsiders can use the subsequent financial
report to evaluate the truthfulness of managers’
earlier statements. In particular, if outsiders later
detect the positive disclosure bias, then a manager’s
disclosure reputation might suffer. In this case one
would expect a rational manager to trade off the
expected benefits from overly optimistic disclosures
against any expected cost from reduced reputation.
In line with Rogers and Stocken (2005) we
predict that the expected damage to a manager’s
reputation increases with a financial report’s use-
fulness for evaluating the truthfulness of managerial
outlook statements. In particular, if the firm operates
in a stable environment with relatively stable
financial results, then investors are more likely to
ascribe any ex post deviation from earlier forecasts
to a biased outlook section. In contrast, if the firm
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operates in a risky, unstable environment with
widely fluctuating financial results, then it is more
difficult to conclude that the tone was a biased
reflection of managers’ expectations. This is true
because a large inconsistency between the ex post
financial result and the ex ante outlook statement
might well be due to unpredictable and uncontrol-
lable events. We predict that this inability to
accurately assess truthfulness reduces a manager’s
expected reputational costs and, as a result, leads to
an increased tendency to bias the tone in forward-
looking statements upwards. This leads to our fifth
hypothesis:
H5: The tone reported by managers is positively
associated with a firm’s business risk.
Our last hypothesis relates to the existence of an
analyst earnings forecast. A possible association
between disclosure and analyst following has long
been acknowledged in the disclosure literature but
the emphasis has traditionally been on the quality of
the disclosure (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996).
This emphasis is consistent with the idea that
analysts are attracted by – or actively demand –
more value-relevant information. An alternative
view is that the existence of an analyst earnings
forecast affects the value of the disclosed signal and
we predict that the relation between tone and analyst
earnings forecast is positive. In particular, a predic-
tion of a positive bias is consistent with the evidence
of an ‘earnings-guidance-game’ between managers
and analysts. This evidence suggests that analysts
regularly issue optimistically biased earnings fore-
casts at the start of a reporting cycle and then ‘walk
down’ the forecast to beatable levels (Richardson et
al., 2004). This ‘walking down’ from optimistic to
pessimistic levels is consistent with managers
issuing positive guidance early on in a reporting
cycle and then – if necessary – providing downward
guidance as the cycle progresses. Such a ‘dual’
disclosure strategy benefits both analysts and man-
agers. Analysts benefit because it provides the
necessary ‘ammunition’ for a favourable recom-
mendation and this helps to generate transactions
from clients. At the same time it also shields
analysts from the embarrassment of a negative
surprise on earnings announcement day. Managers,
in turn, benefit from a good relationship with
analysts and from higher liquidity and share prices.
Given that annual reports are released early on in the
annual reporting cycle we predict that:
H6: Firms with an analyst earnings forecast report
a more positive tone than firms without an
analyst earnings forecast.
We now turn to a discussion of our research design,
including sample selection, content analysis, and
estimation strategy.
3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection
We start our empirical analysis by selecting a
sample of annual reports from the Dialog database.
Dialog is a Thomson Financial product and it
contains large cross-sections of UK annual reports
in electronic format for the years 1996 to 2002.2 The
population of UK firms on Dialog includes fully-
listed LSE firms and firms listed on the AIM but no
unlisted firms. The total number of annual reports
on Dialog for the seven years is 11,756. After
removing financial companies this reduces to
8,098.3 Of those, 7,977 firm-years have a matching
record on Datastream which is our source for a
firm’s accounting variables.
Next, we delete firms with a changing year-end,
and we match each firm-year with the following
year’s change in operating profit margin and sales
growth rate (while deleting observations with
missing accounting data where necessary). We use
the following year’s actual realisation as a proxy for
management’s expectation at the start of the finan-
cial year. Thus, we take the view that any increase
(or decrease) in sales and operating profit margin
can be predicted reasonably well by inside man-
agers but less so by outside investors. As a result we
use next year’s actual change in performance as a
proxy for the value of managers’ private informa-
tion.
We believe that the assumption of managers
being able to forecast – albeit with some error – next
year’s sales and operating profit margin is valid on
two grounds. First, at the time of making forward-
looking statements, first quarter sales and margins
are typically known to management. Second,
backlog orders, production plans, and ongoing
orders and enquiries for the remainder of the year
should give managers a reasonably clear idea of the
direction into which sales and margins are heading.
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2Dialog was discontinued by Thomson Financial in mid-
2004. The year 2002 is the last year with a comprehensive
coverage.
3 Removing financial companies is a standard procedure in
the empirical literature. For example, Clatworthy and Jones
(2003) remove financial companies before selecting firms with
extreme changes in profit before tax. One argument for
removing financial companies is that the formats of their
financial statements are quite different from the formats of non-
financial companies and that it is not clear whether the
additional effort required to reconcile the two formats is
justified given that the remaining sample of non-financial
companies is still very large and still quite representative of the
overall economy.
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At the same time this kind of information is
typically not available to outside investors. Thus,
in the absence of forward-looking disclosures
outsiders will typically rely on the previous year’s
result as a benchmark for next year’s forecast. This
is the rationale for using actual change in perform-
ance as a proxy for a firm’s private information
advantage after the mandatory release of the income
statement but before any voluntary forward-looking
narratives.4 This approach is very similar to that
taken in Miller (2002).5
Subsequently, we rank all firm-years into quar-
tiles, and we do this once on the basis of next year’s
change in operating profit margin, and once on the
basis of next year’s sales growth rate. We define
firm-years as observations with (an expectation of)
strongly increasing (strongly declining) operating
performance if the firm-year falls into the top
(bottom) quartile of both distributions. We refer to
these two groups as UP and DOWN. We use sales
(in addition to profit) as a sample selection criterion
because sales is often regarded as the other key
measure of a firm’s financial performance, and we
wish to rule out the possibility that opposite
expectations for sales and profit could be the reason
for a ‘mixed’ message in the outlook section. We
select only extreme observations – top versus
bottom quartile – because we wish to maximise
the likelihood that management’s private informa-
tion reflects changing trends that are material
enough to be worth reporting.
The above selection criteria lead to an initial
sample of 357 (484) firm-years with strongly
increasing (strongly declining) sales and operating
profit margins. We further reduce the number of
observations for two reasons. First, we delete a large
number of observations where the change in
operating performance appears to be driven mainly
by acquisitions and disposals of subsidiaries and
other related companies. We do this because we
know from our preliminary reading of annual
reports that forward-looking narratives rarely dis-
cuss changes in operating performance that result
from changes in the group composition. To account
for this apparent ‘convention’ we delete such firms,
and for this we take into account acquisitions and
disposals in the year under review and in the next
financial year.6 Second, we remove a small number
of firm-years whose (undeflated) operating profit
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 21/7/2010 04 ABR Schleicher.3d Page 377 of 390
4 Note that while in practice income statements and outlook
sections are typically released together, insiders know the size of
the imminent earnings number at the time of making decisions
on forward-looking disclosures. Thus, with outsiders forming
expectations according to a random walk process, inside
managers can accurately predict the private information advan-
tage they will have once the mandatory earnings announcement
has been made.
5Miller (2002) examines the relation between voluntary
disclosure and earnings performance. Miller (2002) selects his
sample by choosing firms with eight consecutive quarters of
actual earnings increases. As far as the subindex of forward-
looking disclosures is concerned Miller (2002) investigates
whether the amount of forward-looking disclosures responds to
future changes in actual earnings performance. Such an
investigation makes sense only if managers are assumed to
have foresight of future earnings realisations. Also, such an
investigation is only consistent with the theory in Miller (2002)
if at least part of this foresight represents private information.
Note that analyst forecasts of earnings and sales – even if
available for a large number of observations in a sample – are
unlikely to be a valid proxy. In particular, replacing last year’s
performance with analyst forecasts would only be valid if such
forecasts could be observed after the release of the income
statement but before any forward-looking disclosures. In
practice, however, such forecasts do not exist because income
statements and forward-looking narratives are typically released
on the same day. On the other hand, replacing next year’s actual
performance with analyst forecasts is inconsistent with the idea
of private information as analyst forecasts represent market
expectations, not insider expectations. Finally, note that our
proxy for private information effectively assumes rational
expectations on the part of managers and investors (though with
different information sets on which to base expectations). This
assumption of rational expectations is perfectly consistent with
the signalling models in Section 2 as signalling models are also
rational expectations models. In particular, the assumption of
rational expectations is not inconsistent with the idea of
managers trying to bias the tone of forward-looking narratives
so as to maximise current market value for existing sharehold-
ers.
6 One can only speculate about why firms are reluctant to
discuss changes in the trading performance that result from
acquisitions and disposals. As far as acquisitions and disposals
over the coming year are concerned one could argue that
changes in the group composition are often highly uncertain
until the very last minute – for example until shareholder
approval is granted to both entities – and as a result of this
uncertainty management might prefer to stay quiet. However,
this argument cannot apply to acquisitions and disposals in the
year under review for which the 12-months effect in the coming
year is necessarily (much) greater than the contribution in the
current year. Perhaps the firms feel that the performance
implications of such changes in the group composition can now
easily be estimated from the financial statements. Whatever the
precise reason for staying quiet, we prefer to delete such firms.
Otherwise the trading outlook for the continuing businesses –
which is regularly commented upon in the outlook section –
could be dominated in next year’s financial statements by the
effect of acquisitions and disposals – which are regularly not
commented upon. In practical terms we scrutinise the financial
statements for the effect of acquisitions and disposals on sales
and operating profit margin, both in the year under review and in
the next financial year, and we make adjustments (based on
estimates) where possible. For example, we remove the
contribution of next year’s acquisitions and recalculate sales
growth and operating profit margin, and only retain the firm-
year if the two adjusted values still fall into the range of the
(original) top and bottom quartiles. Similarly, for any acquisi-
tion in the current year we scale up the contribution to the
current year by estimating the 12-month effect of current year’s
acquisitions and replace the actual contribution with an
estimated 12-month contribution. For that we assume a lack
of seasonality in sales and operating profit. Note that we delete
firms for which we have insufficient information to make the
necessary adjustments, for example because the date of the first
consolidation in the current year is not given anywhere in the
annual report.
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decreases (increases) despite an increase (decrease)
in the operating profit margin.7 This leaves us with a
final sample of 181 firm-years in the UP group and
321 firms-years in the DOWN group.8
Panel A in Table 1 presents descriptive statistics
for these two groups. The mean (median) sales
growth rate, ΔREVt+1, is 37.4 (30.8%) for the UP
group and 15.2 (–12.5)% for the DOWN group,
while the respective changes in the operating profit
margin, ΔOPMt+1, are 7.5 (4.0) and 9.8 (–5.9)
percentage points. The differences between the two
groups are highly significant, using either a
parametric two-sample t-test (means) or a non-
parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (medians). A
similar picture also emerges if we look at (absolute)
sales, REV, and (absolute) operating profit, OP, in t
and t+1, and compare any changes in these two
variables over the 12-month period across the two
groups. Thus, it is clear from Panel A that our
sample selection procedure was effective in creating
two dichotomous samples with very different
prospects for the coming year. Panel B shows that
– despite this very different outlook – no particular
calendar year dominates our two subsamples.
Next we download the 502 annual reports from
Dialog and identify any ‘outlook sections’ in the
narrative part of the annual report. In a majority of
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics: sample selection
Panel A: Accounting performance
UP
MEAN
UP
STD
UP
MEDIAN
DOWN
MEAN
DOWN
STD
DOWN
MEDIAN
T-TEST
P-VALUE
WILCOXON
P-VALUE
REVt 83 233 21 369 1,183 41 0.000 0.000
REVt+1 109 298 27 328 1,065 35 0.001 0.229
OPt 6 30 1 30 101 3 0.000 0.000
OPt+1 12 39 3 11 80 0 0.790 0.000
OPMt 0.039 0.149 0.054 0.090 0.112 0.077 0.000 0.001
OPMt+1 0.114 0.131 0.092 –0.008 0.144 0.014 0.000 0.000
ΔREVt+1 0.374 0.246 0.308 –0.152 0.102 –0.125 0.000 0.000
ΔOPMt+1 0.075 0.079 0.040 –0.098 0.101 –0.059 0.000 0.000
OBS 181 181 181 321 321 321
Panel B: Calendar year
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 OBS
UP 29 27 23 31 25 30 16 181
DOWN 19 54 62 33 42 78 33 321
ALL 48 81 85 64 67 108 49 502
Panel A presents descriptive statistics on revenue, REV, operating profit, OP, operating profit margin, OPM,
sales growth rate, ΔREV, and change in operating profit margin, ΔOPM. Revenue and operating profit are
measured by Worldscope items WC01001 and WC01250 and are defined as ‘gross sales and other operating
revenue less discounts, returns and allowances’ and ‘difference between sales and total operating expenses’.
REV and OP are measured in £000s, while OPM, ΔREV and ΔOPM are expressed in % and percentage
points, respectively, and then divided by 100. UP (DOWN) refers to the subsample of firm-years with
strongly increasing (decreasing) sales and operating profit margin over the next financial year. A standard
two-sample t-test (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test) is used to test for differences in means (medians) between the
two subsamples. Panel B illustrates the distribution of firm-years across calendar years. STD = standard
deviation. OBS = observations. ALL = combined sample of UP and DOWN.
7We use the change in the operating profit margin (rather than
the growth rate in operating profit) because it avoids the
problems associated with a negative deflator.
8 Note that as we move from the initial to the final sample we
delete a larger proportion of firm-years in UP than in DOWN.
This is because in UP the extreme changes in performance are
driven more frequently by changes in the group composition.
Also note that while the initial subsamples are defined via
quartiles, the exact number of firms that fall into the two initial
subsamples also depends on the correlation structure between
sales growth rate and change in operating profit margin. For
example, if the two performance measures are completely
uncorrelated, then one would expect the number of observations
in each initial subsample to be approximately equal to 7,977 ÷
16 = 499. However, a negative (positive) correlation will
decrease (increase) this number. Thus, our initial sample sizes
are consistent with diminishing returns as firms tend to grow.
This is exactly what microeconomic theory predicts.
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cases it is straightforward to locate such sections
because they are given a special heading. But even
if there are no explicit headings it is often easy to
find these sections because they are almost always
located at the end of the Chairman’s Statement or at
the end of the Chief Executive’s Review. However,
where necessary we read the entire narrative section
of the annual report.
Table 2 gives some background information on
the location of the outlook sections in the annual
report, their headings, and their length. This back-
ground information is given for the combined
sample of 502 annual reports, and also separately
for UP and DOWN, though we notice that any
differences between UP and DOWN are generally
quite small. As Table 2 indicates, we identify a total
of 688 outlook sections in the combined sample,
giving an average of 1.37 outlook sections per
report. Almost three-quarters of these outlook
sections can be found in the Chairman’s
Statement, while other popular choices are the
Chief Executive’s Review, and the Operational and
(or) Financial Review. Only four outlook sections
are outside these three parts.9 In terms of headings
‘Outlook’ and ‘Prospects’ account for almost half of
all headings, while ‘Current trading’ and ‘Future’
are also frequently chosen. Around a quarter of all
outlook sections have no headings at all. Finally,
Panel C of Table 2 indicates the mean and median
length of an outlook section, measured both in terms
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics: outlook section
UP
181 OBS
UP
181 OBS
DOWN
321 OBS
DOWN
321 OBS
ALL
502 OBS
ALL
502 OBS
Panel A: Location
TOTAL % TOTAL % TOTAL %
Chairman’s Statement 185 74.3 321 73.1 506 73.5
Chief Executive’s Review 34 13.7 88 20.0 122 17.7
Operational and (or) Financial Review 29 11.6 27 6.2 56 8.1
Other 1 0.4 3 0.7 4 0.6
–––––– –––––– –––––– –––––– –––––– ––––––
249 100.0 439 100.0 688 100.0
Panel B: Heading
TOTAL % TOTAL % TOTAL %
Current trading 27 10.8 46 10.5 73 10.6
Future 17 6.8 32 7.3 49 7.1
Looking ahead/forward 3 1.2 6 1.4 9 1.3
Outlook 51 20.5 117 26.7 168 24.4
Prospects 66 26.5 89 20.3 155 22.5
Summary 11 4.4 17 3.9 28 4.1
Other 15 6.0 22 5.0 37 5.4
No heading 59 23.7 110 25.1 169 24.6
–––––– –––––– –––––– –––––– –––––– ––––––
249 100.0 439 100.0 688 100.0
Panel C: Length
MEAN MEDIAN MEAN MEDIAN MEAN MEDIAN
Sentences 7.7 6 7.6 6 7.6 6
Words 190 151 194 170 192 163
UP and DOWN refer to the two subsamples of firm-years with strongly increasing and strongly decreasing
sales and operating profit margins over the next financial year. ALL = combined sample of UP and DOWN.
OBS = observations.
9 Two outlook sections are found in the ‘Directors’ Report’.
Another two outlook sections are located in the ‘Statement of
Prospects’ and in ‘Positioned for the Future’.
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of sentences and words. It is clear from Panel C that,
with only six sentences, the median outlook section
is a rather small part of the annual report.
Given the length of the outlook section it might
seem surprising that we focus exclusively on these
short sections. Clearly, forward-looking narratives
can be found elsewhere in the annual report. We
have decided to focus on the outlook section for
three reasons. First, Smith and Taffler (2000)
observe consistency in the use of tone throughout
narratives. This suggests that the tone in the outlook
section is representative of the tone outside these
sections. Second, statements in the outlook section
typically deal with group prospects, while forward-
looking narratives outside these sections are typic-
ally concerned with the outlook for individual
segments. By aggregating segmental prospects into
group prospects outlook sections effectively sum-
marise forward-looking narratives in other parts of
the annual report. Also, our focus on group
prospects is consistent with prior studies on the
usefulness and value-relevance of forward-looking
disclosures (e.g. Hutton et al., 2003) as these studies
deal with group forecasts, not with forecasts for
individual segments. Finally, the content of the
outlook section is frequently released to the stock
market together with the preliminary earnings
announcement and very often with exactly the
same wording as in the annual report later on.
Again, we believe that this suggests that special
importance is attached to these summary sections
by capital market participants.10 We now turn to a
discussion of the way in which we measure tone in
the annual report outlook section.
3.2. Measuring tone
We assess tone by manually reading all the
sentences in the outlook section and by taking
context into account. This approach is referred to in
the literature as ‘meaning-orientated’ content analy-
sis (e.g. Krippendorf, 1980; Weber, 1990). While
such an analysis is frequently perceived to be more
subjective than computer-assisted ‘form-orientated’
frequency counts, it is dictated by our focus on
impression management. In particular, impression
management techniques are usually subtle, complex
and sophisticated (Brennan et al., 2008) and they
warrant a coding technique that is more sensitive
than computer-assisted word counts (Clatworthy
and Jones, 2003).
We start the scoring process by determining an
outlook statement’s underlying topic. We differen-
tiate between ‘sales’, ‘costs’, ‘earnings’, ‘cash flow’,
‘dividends’, ‘market share’, statements about a
firm’s ‘industry’ and the wider ‘economy’, general
‘trading’ statements, references to ‘growth’ and
‘success and progress’, and even statements about
the outlook in general (which we refer to as ‘general
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 21/7/2010 04 ABR Schleicher.3d Page 380 of 390
Table 3
Measuring tone: examples
‘The new year has
started positively with
unit sales in the first
quarter being 20%
higher than the same
quarter of last year.’
[Tracker Network plc,
Chairman’s Statement,
Future Outlook, 1996]
‘The board looks to the
remainder of 1998
with great confidence.’
[Easynet Group plc,
Chairman’s State-
ment, Business
Outlook, 1997]
‘We remain in a very
demanding sector, with
plenty of tough
challenges ahead.’
[Howle Holdings plc,
Chairman’s Report,
Outlook, 2002]
‘ . . . we expect to
generate significant
profit growth in the
upturn.’
[United Business
Media plc, Chief
Executive’s Review,
2001]
Topic Sales General unspecified
statement
Industry Earnings
Tone
Positive 1 1 0 1
Neutral 0 0 0 0
Negative 0 0 1 0
The table illustrates our approach to measuring tone. The three tone categories are listed in the left-hand side
column. The remaining columns contain four example statements and are used to illustrate our coding of
tone. The three tone categories are given a score of 1 for ‘existent’ and 0 for ‘non-existent’. The three
categories are mutually exclusive.
10 Another reason for our focus on the outlook section is more
practical. In particular, the manual coding of tone is a very time-
consuming process and is feasible only if the number of
sentences is strictly limited.
380 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:23
 03
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
unspecified statements’). This list of topics has been
compiled after reading a set of 100 out-of-sample
outlook sections from the two middle quartiles.
Note that while we read outlook sections sentence
by sentence our unit of measurement is actually the
‘statement’. Thus, while in most cases one sentence
contains exactly one statement, it is also possible for
sentences to contain more than one statement, if –
for example – a sentence contains a prediction for
both sales and profits.11
Next, we determine tone for each statement. We
follow Bryan (1997) and Lang and Lundholm
(2000) and differentiate between positive, neutral
and negative statements. Positive and negative
statements include both directional forecasts as well
as general impressions. While directional forecasts
with their explicit or implicit benchmarks are
relatively easy to code, judging general impressions
is more subjective. To mitigate this subjectivity we
compiled – prior to the coding of our two
subsamples – a list of keywords from the 100
out-of-sample outlook sections. This list was
intended to guide the first-named author in his
judgment of a statement’s tone and to increase the
consistency of his judgments over time. The list
contains keywords which are frequently associated
with positive and negative impressions like ‘prom-
ising’, ‘confident’ and ‘benefits’ for positive pro-
spects and ‘difficult’, ‘challenging’ and ‘soft’ for
negative prospects. Finally, we define a statement
as neutral if the statement uses keywords like
‘same’, ‘in line with’ or ‘no growth’, if it includes a
mixed message with both positive and negative
aspects, or if it appears to be factual without any
apparent positive or negative connotation. Note that
in assessing tone we take context into account.
Thus, a firm’s prediction of a ‘reduced loss’ would
be coded as a positive statement even though,
individually, the two underlying keywords –
‘reduced’ and ‘loss’ – are commonly associated
with a negative tone.
A number of coding rules applied to our scoring
process. In particular, we needed a decision rule for
cases where more than one statement is made
about the same topic. In such cases we decided to
record only the ‘highest-ranked’ and ‘least ambigu-
ous’ statement on our scoring sheet. This is similar
to a decision rule in Kasznik and Lev (1995). For
example, if a profit outlook is given for the first
quarter as well as for the full year, then only the
full year outlook is recorded. Where such a
decision rule leads to no clear-cut ranking we
record the statement that comes first in terms of
chronological order if the tone of the competing
statements is identical. Alternatively, if the tone is
different then we record a neutral statement. For
example, a neutral tone is recorded for ‘costs’ if the
firm indicates that next year’s pension charge is
likely to increase while other input prices are likely
to ease.
Table 3 illustrates our scoring system for four
example statements. It shows that the three tone
categories are given a score of 1 for ‘existent’ and
0 for ‘non-existent’ and that the three tone categor-
ies are mutually exclusive. It also shows that we
judge tone without reference to other forecast
attributes. For example, the fourth statement is
judged to be positive as the statement refers to
‘profit growth’ and this amounts to a directional
forecast. In particular, we do not take into account
the existence of a conditional statement. We under-
stand that some might argue that the existence of a
conditional statement weakens the positive message
of the outlook statement. However, judging the tone
of the fourth example as neutral (or even negative)
is problematic as the firm has made a very clear
choice of not commenting on any periods prior to
the upturn. This is a case of non-disclosure. If one
interprets non-disclosure as bad news then one
assumes that the predictions of early signalling
theories are correct. But then there is no need to test
these theories on real-world forward-looking nar-
ratives.
Whenever a research design relies on manual
content analysis reliability is an important consid-
eration. To assess inter-coder reliability the second-
named author coded once again the tone for a
random sample of 50 annual reports. As far as the
existence (non-existence) of topics is concerned the
two coders agreed in 555 out of 600 cases. For the
102 cases where both coders judged a topic to be
present, the agreement rate for ‘tone’ is 98%. This
agreement rate compares favourably with the 80%
benchmark for inter-coder reliability in Milne and
Adler (1999).
Finally, it is worth noting that, before any
coding took place, we removed from the outlook
sections any references to the identity of the firm.
This makes it less likely that any potential bias is
correlated with the variables of interest. For
example, with the coder being unaware about a
firm’s loss status it becomes less likely that a
coder’s potential measurement bias could vary
across profit and loss firms. In other words, a
systematic measurement error – even if it existed
– should be constant across the two groups, and
thus the estimated difference in tone between loss
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 21/7/2010 04 ABR Schleicher.3d Page 381 of 390
11 Note that throughout the paper we refer to the entirety of
forward-looking statements as ‘outlook section’.
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and profit firms should be an unbiased estimate of
the true difference. Similar arguments apply to
H4, H5 and H6. We now turn to a discussion of
our testing strategy. Different strategies apply to
the two parts of our paper, namely H1–H2 and
H3–H6.
3.3. Hypothesis testing and regression model
H1 and H2 make predictions about the relative
frequency of positive and negative statements in UP
and DOWN. We test H1 and H2 in two ways. First,
we calculate the mean and median difference
between positive and negative statements and we
test whether these differences are statistically sig-
nificant. Second, we calculate a measure of overall
tone as the deflated difference between positive and
negative statements and we use the sum of positive,
neutral and negative statements as the deflator. The
advantage of this tone variable is that it is a
standardised measure of forecast news as it no
longer varies with the absolute number of state-
ments. Instead, for all firms it ranges from 1 for
entirely negative to 1 for entirely positive. This
standardised range makes it easy to compare tone
across observations. Thus, the standardised tone
variable will be our preferred measure of tone in
subsequent tests.12
In the second part of our paper we test H3–H6
through a cross-sectional regression of standardised
tone on loss status (H3), the sign of previous year’s
earnings change (H4), a measure of business risk
(H5), and an indicator variable for the existence of
an analyst earning forecast (H6). For this we include
LOSSt, EARNDOWNt, RISKt and AFt as the inde-
pendent variables of main interest. In addition, we
control for next year’s performance by including
UPDOWNt+1, ΔREVt+1 and ΔOPMt+1 as additional
regressors. This yields our regression model (1):
TONEt ¼ b0 þ b1UPDOWNtþ1 þ b2DREVtþ1
þ b3DOPMtþ1 þ b4LOSSt
þ b5EARNDOWNt þ b6RISKt þ b7AFt
þ et ð1Þ
where LOSSt and EARNDOWNt are dummy vari-
ables that equal 1 if period t’s earnings is negative
and lower, respectively, and 0 otherwise, RISKt is
defined as the standard deviation of ROE for the
five-year period t–4 to t, and AFt is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if Datastream reports in
period t at least one annual analyst earnings forecast
for period t+1, and 0 otherwise. In terms of control
variables, UPDOWNt+1 is a dummy variable that
equals 1 for UP (and 0 for DOWN) and it controls
for the sign of next year’s performance change
whenever we pool UP and DOWN, while our
sample selection variables, ΔREVt+1 and ΔOPMt+1,
control for the magnitude of next year’s sales
growth rate and change in operating profit margin.
Note the importance of controlling for future
performance in testing our ceteris paribus predic-
tions H3–H6. For example, H3 predicts that loss
firm managers report a more positive tone than
profit firm managers, but this is done on the
assumption that both types of firms have the same
outlook for the future. However, in reality the
outlook is likely to vary between profit and loss
firms and with it an outlook section’s tone. In testing
H3–H6 we allow for this variation by including
UPDOWNt+1, ΔREVt+1 and ΔOPMt+1 as controls
for the sign and the magnitude of next year’s
financial performance. Finally, the dependent vari-
able in Equation (1), TONEt, is the standardised
measure of overall tone and ranges from 1 to 1.
We base the definition of all earnings and profit
variables – including LOSSt, EARNDOWNt and
ΔOPMt+1 – on Worldscope item WC01250. This
item is defined as ‘operating income’ and repre-
sents the ‘difference between sales and total
operation expenses’. In particular, it excludes all
types of operating and non-operating exceptional
items. We use this definition for three reasons.
First, Schleicher et al. (2007) demonstrate that this
income number is highly correlated with other
measures of ‘permanent’ earnings. Permanence is a
desirable feature in the context of our study as it
increases the likelihood that outsiders’ expectations
are formed according to a random walk process.
Also, the elimination of exceptional items
increases the predictability of next year’s earnings
from an insider’s point of view. Second, trading
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12 The treatment of neutral statements in the calculation of the
overall tone variable deserves some further explanation. In
particular, in calculating a standardised measure of tone a
number of previous content analysis studies deflate by the sum
of positive and negative keywords but not by neutral keywords
(e.g. Brennan et al., 2008; Citron et al., 2008; Henry, 2008). Our
decision to include neutral statements in the calculation of an
overall tone’s deflator is taken for two reasons. First, very often
we code a statement as neutral if the outlook section makes a
positive and a negative statement on the same topic. Previous
content analysis studies commonly code these statements as two
separate statements with a corresponding increase in the
deflator. Thus, including neutral statements in the deflator is
indeed quite consistent with the prior literature. Second, neutral
statements substantially increase the variability of the overall
tone variable, especially for UP firms. Meaningful estimation of
regression coefficients in part two of the paper is dependent on a
minimum degree of variability in the regression variables.
Finally, note that the numerator of the overall tone variable is
unaffected by any decision in favour (or against) including
neutral statements within the analysis.
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statements conventionally comment on a firm’s
operating side but rarely on financial or tax aspects.
The use of ‘operating’ income is consistent with
this convention. Third, the argument that a nega-
tive or a declining income number is a disappoint-
ment and has costly consequences for managers is
more convincing for a permanent than for a
transitory earnings number (e.g. Walker and
Louvari, 2003).
We define LOSSt and EARNDOWNt as dichot-
omous variables as H3 and H4 predict that it is the
incidence, rather than the magnitude, of a loss and
an earnings decline that affects a manager’s choice
of tone. Similarly, H6 predicts that it is the existence
of an analyst earning forecast that leads to a more
positive tone. Thus, we also define AFt as a
dichotomous variable. Finally, we use ROE to
measure RISKt as ROE depends on changes in sales
as well as changes in the operating profit margin,
both of which are key performance measures in our
study.
4. Results
We start our empirical investigation by analysing
the distribution of positive and negative statements,
POS and NEG, across our two subsamples, UP and
DOWN. These distributions are reported in Table 4
and they are used to test H1 and H2.
Looking at Table 4 we first note that the mean and
median number of positive statements in UP is 2.87
and 3 while the corresponding numbers in DOWN
are 1.84 and 2. Also, for both groups the number of
positive statements exceeds the number of negative
statements: the mean and median value for POS –
NEG is 2.64 and 3 in UP and 0.80 and 1 in DOWN.
A parametric one-sample t-test for the mean and
non-parametric Sign and Sign-Rank tests for the
median confirm that the differences between posi-
tive and negative statements are significant at the
0.000 level in both groups. This finding is consistent
with H1 but leads to a rejection of H2. Thus, while
UP firms understandably emphasise positive
aspects more than negative aspects, it is not the
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Table 4
Tone
MEAN MIN 25% MEDIAN 75% MAX T-TEST SIGN SIGN
RANK
OBS
Panel A: UP
POS 2.87 0 2 3 4 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 181
NEU 0.23 0 0 0 0 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 181
NEG 0.24 0 0 0 0 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 181
POS – NEG 2.64 –1 1 3 4 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 181
TONE 0.80 –0.33 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 181
Panel B: DOWN
POS 1.84 0 1 2 3 6 0.000 0.000 0.000 321
NEU 0.58 0 0 0 1 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 321
NEG 1.04 0 0 1 2 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 321
POS – NEG 0.80 –4 0 1 2 6 0.000 0.000 0.000 321
TONE 0.24 –1.00 0.00 0.25 0.67 1.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 321
Panel C: ALL
POS 2.21 0 1 2 3 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 502
NEU 0.45 0 0 0 1 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 502
NEG 0.75 0 0 1 1 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 502
POS – NEG 1.46 –4 0 1 3 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 502
TONE 0.44 –1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 502
The table presents descriptive statistics on the tone of forward-looking narratives in the annual report
outlook section. POS, NEU and NEG are the (absolute) number of positive, neutral and negative statements
per annual report outlook section. TONE is a measure of the overall tone. It is defined as the difference
between positive and negative statements, POS – NEG, and scaled by the sum of positive, neutral and
negative statements, POS + NEU + NEG. UP (DOWN) refers to the subsample of firm-years with strongly
increasing (decreasing) sales and operating profit margin over the next financial year. A standard one-sample
t-test (Sign test and Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test) is used to test for the significance of means (medians).
P-values are reported to indicate significance levels. MIN = minimum. 25% = bottom quartile. 75% = top
quartile. MAX = maximum. OBS = observations. ALL = combined sample of UP and DOWN.
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case that DOWN firms emphasise negative news or,
at least, remain silent, as predicted by signalling
models. Rather DOWN firms also dwell mainly on
positive news and this conclusion is reinforced by
the TONE variable: for DOWN firms the mean and
median value of TONE is 0.24 and 0.25, respect-
ively, with p-values of 0.000. Thus, our main
finding in this part of the paper is that DOWN firms
bias the tone of forward-looking narratives
upwards. This is consistent with impression man-
agement. It is also consistent with the evidence on
predominately backward-looking narratives in
Clatworthy and Jones (2003).
Next, we test H3–H6 by estimating the cross-
sectional regression model (1). As indicated above
estimating (1) is an attempt to detect further and
perhaps more subtle changes in tone that remain
unnoticed in simple tests of means and medians.
Regression results are reported, together with
descriptive statistics, in Table 5. We report separate
results for the 162 UP firms, the 299 DOWN firms,
and the combined sample of 461 UP and DOWN
firms, and we note that missing observations for the
four managerial incentive variables reduce the
sample size by 19 and 22 observations, respectively.
We also note from Panel B that 25.3 and 13.0% of
our sample firms are loss firms, while 42.0 and
50.5%, respectively, have period t earnings which
are lower than earnings in t–1. Finally, 68.5 and
73.2% of our observations have an analyst earnings
forecast. Overall, we conclude that there is suffi-
cient variation in our regression variables.
Table 5, Panel A reports two different types of
regressions, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion and a ROBUST regression. A ROBUST
regression attempts to minimise the effect of influ-
ential observations by reducing the weight that is
given to these observations in the calculation of
regression coefficients. In an extreme case this
weight can be reduced to zero. This contrasts with
OLS which gives a disproportionately large weight
to influential observations as its estimates are chosen
to minimise the sum of squared residuals. We report
ROBUST in addition to OLS as an alternative to
deleting (or trimming) influential observations.13
We start our interpretation of Table 5 by noting
that the two estimation strategies produce regres-
sion results that are generally quite similar, both in
terms of estimates and p-values, with only two
notable exceptions, the p-value associated with the
RISKt variable in the UP sample and the p-value
associated with the ΔREVt+1 variable in the com-
bined sample. Thus, we conclude that the regression
results in Table 5 are not particularly sensitive to the
existence of outliers.
In terms of control variables we note that the tone
in the outlook section is at best weakly associated
with the magnitude of next year’s performance
change. None of the coefficients associated with
ΔREVt+1 is significant at the 0.050 level and the six
coefficients on ΔOPMt+1 are all insignificantly
negative. Thus, the evidence in Table 5 suggests
that firms do not use the tone in the outlook section
to signal their expectations about the magnitude of
the impending performance change. This contrasts
with the findings in Kasznik and Lev (1995).
However, when we pool UP and DOWN and
includeUPDOWNt+1 as an indicator variable for the
sign of next year’s performance change, then the
coefficient on this variable is positive and signifi-
cant, and its values of 0.44 and 0.43 are similar to
the difference in tone between UP and DOWN in
Table 4 of 0.56 = 0.80 – 0.24.
The coefficients of primary interest in Table 5 are
those associated with LOSSt, EARNDOWNt, RISKt
and AFt and they are used to test H3–H6. We make
the following four observations. First, the coeffi-
cient on LOSSt is positive and highly significant in
five out of six regressions, including the three robust
regressions. This means that loss firms provide a
more positive outlook than profit firms. This is
consistent with H3 that loss firm managers feel a
need to use a positive outlook section to override the
negative signal sent out by current earnings. Note,
however, that the more positive outlook section
does not translate into a higher performance in t+1
as next year’s performance is being controlled for in
the regression model.
Second, the coefficient on EARNDOWNt is
consistently negative and significantly so in the
UP sample and in the combined sample, and for
these two samples we reject H4 in favour of the
alternative that managers become more conserva-
tive in their forecasts when earnings decline in the
year under review. We have argued in Section 2 that
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13 In Table 5 (and Table 6 below) we report the results of a
Yohai (1987)-style robust regression because – unlike other
robust regression methods – it can identify influential observa-
tions in the y-space (‘outliers’) as well as in the x-space
(‘leverage points’). However, in all cases untabulated results
from ‘median’ regressions and Huber (1973)-style regressions
are always very similar to those reported under the column
‘ROBUST’. Perhaps this is unsurprising given that the propor-
tion of leverage points is zero in all tables. In relation to OLS we
report below the coefficient estimates p-values which are
calculated from Clustered (‘Rogers’) standard errors and which
allow for cross-sectional correlation within clusters. Clusters are
defined in terms of two-digit SIC codes. In most cases the
reported p-values are quite similar to those that allow only for
heteroscedasticity. Finally, note that we include, but do not
tabulate, six incremental year dummies within all our regression
models.
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Table 5
Determinants of cross-sectional variation in tone
Panel A: Regression results
Regressant TONEt TONEt TONEt
OLS ROBUST OLS ROBUST OLS ROBUST
UPDOWNt+1 (+) 0.44***
(0.000)
0.43***
(0.000)
ΔREVt+1 (+) 0.09
(0.429)
0.08
(0.442)
0.51*
(0.056)
0.58
(0.113)
0.19*
(0.076)
0.16
(0.291)
ΔOPMt+1 (+) –0.20
(0.666)
–0.15
(0.667)
–0.20
(0.428)
–0.18
(0.646)
–0.24
(0.204)
–0.17
(0.537)
LOSSt (+) 0.14*
(0.068)
0.18***
(0.003)
0.34***
(0.000)
0.35***
(0.001)
0.23***
(0.000)
0.24***
(0.000)
EARNDOWNt (?) –0.17**
(0.011)
–0.19***
(0.000)
–0.09
(0.104)
–0.10
(0.176)
–0.11***
(0.009)
–0.13***
(0.007)
RISKt (+) 0.02**
(0.045)
0.01
(0.508)
0.03***
(0.000)
0.03**
(0.036)
0.03***
(0.000)
0.02**
(0.022)
AFt (+) 0.06
(0.149)
0.04
(0.408)
0.18**
(0.033)
0.18**
(0.024)
0.16***
(0.006)
0.13**
(0.013)
R2 14.83 11.60 11.66 10.35 31.29 26.28
Adj. R2 7.97 7.96 29.30
F-Value 6.09***
(0.000)
5.34***
(0.000)
35.58***
(0.000)
Outliers (in %) 2.47 0.00 0.00
OBS 162 162 299 299 461 461
Sample UP UP DOWN DOWN ALL ALL
Panel B: Descriptive statistics
Sample UP UP UP UP DOWN DOWN DOWN DOWN
MEAN STD MEDIAN OBS MEAN STD MEDIAN OBS
TONEt 0.789 0.317 1.000 162 0.236 0.545 0.250 299
ΔREVt+1 0.352 0.230 0.287 162 –0.152 0.105 –0.124 299
ΔOPMt+1 0.075 0.082 0.040 162 –0.094 0.099 –0.057 299
LOSSt 0.253 0.436 0.000 162 0.130 0.337 0.000 299
EARNDOWNt 0.420 0.495 0.000 162 0.505 0.501 1.000 299
RISKt 0.375 1.403 0.092 162 0.537 2.384 0.094 299
AFt 0.685 0.466 1.000 162 0.732 0.443 1.000 299
The table reports regression results in Panel A and descriptive statistics for the regression variables in Panel B.
A ROBUST regression minimises the effect of influential observations, while OLS does not. The regressant,
TONEt, is a measure of the overall tone of forward-looking narratives in the annual report outlook section. It
is defined as the difference between positive and negative statements and scaled by the sum of all (positive,
neutral and negative) statements. ΔREVt+1 and ΔOPMt+1 are sales growth rate and change in operating profit
margin in t+1 (where revenue and operating profit are measured by Worldscope items WC01001 and
WC01250 and are defined as ‘gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances’
and ‘difference between sales and total operating expenses’). LOSSt and EARNDOWNt are dummy variables
that equal 1 if period t’s earnings is negative and lower, respectively, and 0 otherwise, RISKt is defined as the
standard deviation of ROE for the five-year period t–4 to t, and AFt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
Datastream reports in period t at least one annual analyst earnings forecast for period t+1, and 0 otherwise.
The three sets of regressions refer to UP, DOWN, and the combined sample of UP and DOWN (where UP
(DOWN) refers to the subsample of firm-years with strongly increasing (decreasing) sales and operating profit
margins over the next financial year). We include incremental year dummies in all regressions. In addition,
when we pool UP and DOWN, we also include an intercept dummy, UPDOWNt+1, which takes on the value
of 1 for UP firms and 0 for DOWN firms. (+) and (?) indicate a positive and no prediction, respectively, for
the sign of the regression coefficient. In relation to OLS we report below the coefficient estimates p-values
which are calculated from Clustered (‘Rogers’) standard errors and which allow for cross-sectional correlation
within clusters. Clusters are defined in terms of two-digit SIC codes. The significance levels (two-tail test) are:
* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. The table reports three statistics for the overall model fit, the R2 (in %), the
adjusted R2 (in %) and the F-Value (and its associated p-value in parentheses). OBS = observations. STD =
standard deviation. ALL = combined sample of UP and DOWN.
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a conservative bias would be consistent with a
desire of not surprising the market negatively,
especially if the current earnings decline is out of
line with last year’s guidance. While we have no
direct evidence on last year’s guidance, the domin-
ance of positive statements over negative statements
for DOWN firms in Table 4 suggests that most firms
with a current earnings decline might well have
provided positive guidance at the start of the year.
Third, we find that risky firms in the DOWN
sample and in the combined sample provide a
significantly more positive tone than firms that are
less risky. This is consistent with the evidence from
‘hard’ management earnings forecasts in Rogers
and Stocken (2005) and suggests that managers bias
the tone upwards if the firm’s widely fluctuating
results make it difficult for outsiders to ex post
monitor the truthfulness of forward-looking narra-
tives. This observation is consistent with H5.
Finally, the coefficient on the analyst earnings
forecast dummy, AFt, is consistently positive and
significantly so in the DOWN sample and in the
combined sample. Thus, Table 5 suggests that the
existence of an analyst earnings forecast provides
an additional incentive for managers to increase the
visibility of positive (earnings) trends. As far as we
know, this is the first direct evidence of the role of
managerial disclosures in the ‘earnings-guidance
game’. In particular, it appears that firms ‘help’
analysts by issuing positive guidance early on in the
annual reporting cycle and in this way they provide
the necessary ammunition for optimistic earnings
forecasts. This is consistent with H6.
Overall the results in Table 5 suggest that it is not
only the sign of next year’s performance change, but
also a firm’s past performance, its risk, and the
existence of an analyst earnings forecast that affect a
manager’s choice of tone. Thus, the tone in the
outlook section is not only a biased reflection of the
future – as shown in Table 4 – but it is also managed
in response to a number of managerial incentives
that are unrelated to future performance. This is
inconsistent with signalling models, but consistent
with thealternativeviewof impressionmanagement.
Two observations from Table 5 deserve a special
mention. First, managers do not always bias the
tone upwards. Instead, concern about (short-term)
job market implications and (long-term) reputa-
tional effects appear to exist side by side. Second,
the direction of the bias differs with the type of the
disappointment.
Before we conclude, we wish to examine what
type of statement is being managed in response to
the four stimuli that underlie H3–H6. In principle, if
one wishes to change an outlook section’s tone, then
one can either change the number of positive
statements or the number of neutral statement or the
number of negative statements. To examine which
type of statement is being managed we regress in
Table 6 the absolute number of positive, neutral and
negative statements on the four incentive variables
(and the three control variables). Given that the
signs of all coefficients in Table 5 are consistent
across the two subsamples, we only report results
for the combined sample in Table 6.14
We make the following three observations. First,
the increase in the overall tone for loss firms and for
risky firms is driven both by an increase in positive
statements and a reduction in neutral and negative
statements, but only the coefficients in the NEG
regression are significant in both OLS and
ROBUST. Second, a reduction in tone for firms
with declining earnings is achieved by reducing the
number of positive statements while also increasing
the number of neutral and negative statements, but
once again only the coefficients in the NEG
regression are consistently significant. Third, an
increase in the tone for firms with an analyst
earnings forecast is achieved through a reduction in
negative statements and an increase in positive
statements, but only the coefficients in the POS
regression are large and significant.15,16
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14 In Table 6 we do not deflate the absolute number of
positive, neutral and negative statements because this could
induce a spurious relation. Imagine, for example, a firm which
dramatically increases the number of positive statements. If we
express positive, neutral and negative statements as a proportion
of all statements, then the values for NEU and NEG decrease
even though the absolute number of neutral and negative
statements remains unchanged. To avoid our results only
reflecting such a cross-dependence in the proportion of positive,
neutral and negative statements we use undeflated dependent
variables in Table 6. Also note that we do not formulate formal
hypotheses for Table 6. However, such hypotheses can be
derived easily from H3–H6 by replacing ‘tone’ or ‘positive tone’
with ‘positive statements’. Similarly, one can replace ‘tone’ or
‘positive tone’with ‘negative statements’ and change the sign of
the prediction where necessary.
15We also ran a TOBIT regression to acknowledge that POSt,
NEUt and NEGt are effectively censored variables with a lower
bound of 0. The coefficients from TOBIT regressions always
have the same sign as those reported in Table 6 and the size of
the coefficients is always very similar in POSt (which has less
than 10% of left-censored observations) but is frequently
(much) larger (in absolute terms) in NEUt and NEGt (which
have a much larger number of censored observations). However,
in all three regressions the p-values are quite similar to those
reported in Table 6 and thus our conclusions are qualitatively
unaffected by using OLS and ROBUST instead of TOBIT, even
for NEUt and NEGt.
16When we include an additional variable in Table 6 to
control for the cross-sectional variation in the number of
sentences per outlook section, then the response coefficient on
this variable lies between 0.00 and 0.07, and the coefficient is
highly significant in the POSt and NEUt regressions, but
insignificant in the NEGt regression. More importantly, the
coefficients on LOSSt, EARNDOWNt, RISKt and AFt and their
associated p-values remain largely unchanged.
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Table 6
Determinants of cross-sectional variation in the number of positive, neutral and negative statements
Panel A: Regression results
Regressant POSt NEUt NEGt
OLS ROBUST OLS ROBUST OLS ROBUST
UPDOWNt+1 (+/–) 0.68***
(0.009)
0.61**
(0.016)
–0.21**
(0.045)
–0.12
(0.249)
–0.77***
(0.000)
–0.65***
(0.000)
ΔREVt+1 (+/–) 0.72*
(0.052)
0.84*
(0.056)
–0.32**
(0.043)
–0.39**
(0.031)
–0.11
(0.570)
0.05
(0.815)
ΔOPMt+1 (+/–) –0.19
(0.797)
0.02
(0.980)
0.54
(0.132)
0.44
(0.167)
0.55
(0.167)
0.38
(0.333)
LOSSt (+/–) 0.06
(0.697)
0.07
(0.681)
–0.18**
(0.013)
–0.12
(0.111)
–0.33***
(0.000)
–0.30***
(0.002)
EARNDOWNt (?) –0.11
(0.364)
–0.02
(0.863)
0.12**
(0.028)
0.07
(0.223)
0.14**
(0.029)
0.17**
(0.019)
RISKt (+/–) 0.01
(0.599)
0.01
(0.734)
–0.02**
(0.015)
–0.01
(0.495)
–0.04***
(0.000)
–0.03**
(0.038)
AFt (+/–) 0.59***
(0.001)
0.69***
(0.000)
–0.06
(0.407)
0.00
(0.980)
–0.05
(0.626)
–0.04
(0.654)
R2 18.88 17.26 10.07 6.72 21.40 14.89
Adj. R2 16.52 7.45 19.11
F-Value 11.78***
(0.000)
4.71***
(0.000)
19.21***
(0.000)
Outliers (in %) 0.87 2.39 2.60
OBS 461 461 461 461 461 461
Sample ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL
Panel B: Descriptive statistics
Sample ALL ALL ALL ALL
MEAN STD MEDIAN OBS
POSt 2.215 1.428 2.000 461
NEUt 0.469 0.693 0.000 461
NEGt 0.777 0.949 1.000 461
UPDOWNt+1 0.351 0.478 0.000 461
ΔREVt+1 0.025 0.289 –0.076 461
ΔOPMt+1 –0.035 0.123 –0.033 461
LOSSt 0.174 0.379 0.000 461
EARNDOWNt 0.475 0.499 0.000 461
RISKt 0.480 2.092 0.095 461
AFt 0.716 0.452 1.000 461
The table reports regression results in Panel A and descriptive statistics for the regression variables in Panel B.
A ROBUST regression minimises the effect of influential observations, while OLS does not. The three
regressants, POSt, NEUt and NEGt, measure the absolute number of positive, neutral and negative statements
per annual report outlook section. ΔREVt+1 and ΔOPMt+1 are sales growth rate and change in operating profit
margin in t+1 (where revenue and operating profit are measured by Worldscope items WC01001 and
WC01250 and are defined as ‘gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances’
and ‘difference between sales and total operating expenses’). LOSSt and EARNDOWNt are dummy variables
that equal 1 if period t’s earnings is negative and lower, respectively, and 0 otherwise, RISKt is defined as the
standard deviation of ROE for the five-year period t–4 to t, and AFt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
Datastream reports in period t at least one annual analyst earnings forecast for period t+1, and 0 otherwise.
All regressions refer to the combined sample of UP and DOWN (where UP (DOWN) refers to the subsample
of firm-years with strongly increasing (decreasing) sales and operating profit margins over the next financial
year) and we include an intercept dummy, UPDOWNt+1, which takes on the value of 1 for UP and 0 for
DOWN. We also include incremental year dummies in all regressions. (+), (–) and (?) indicate a positive, a
negative, and no prediction, respectively, for the sign of the regression coefficient. Where we indicate two
predictions, the first relates to the POSt regression and the second to the NEGt regression. In relation to OLS
we report below the coefficient estimates p-values which are calculated from Clustered (‘Rogers’) standard
errors and which allow for cross-sectional correlation within clusters. Clusters are defined in terms of two-
digit SIC codes. The significance levels (two-tail test) are: * = 10 %, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. The table reports
three statistics for the overall model fit, the R2 (in %), the adjusted R2 (in %) and the F-Value (and its
associated p-value in parentheses). OBS = observations. STD = standard deviation. ALL = combined sample
of UP and DOWN.
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We believe the results in Table 6 are important for
a number of reasons. First, they demonstrate that the
changes in the number of positive and negative
statements are consistent with the changes in the
overall tone and in that they add further strength to
the findings in Table 5. Second, the results in
Table 6 suggest that for a majority of incentives the
main vehicle for managing the overall tone is to
change the number of negative statements. We
believe this is an important observation as it
demonstrates that impression management is not
restricted to positive statements only. As such it
calls into question the conventional wisdom of bad
news being inherently more reliable than good news
(e.g. Skinner, 1994; Hutton et al., 2003). Third, the
only variable for which the change in positive
statements is larger (in absolute terms) than the
corresponding change in negative statements is the
presence of an analyst earnings forecast. Perhaps
this is unsurprising given that analysts demand
visibility of growth for their earnings forecasts and
that such visibility is hardly demonstrated by
suppressing bad news only. Finally, the results in
Table 6 confirm our impression from Table 4 that
neutral statements are in effect negative news: with
one exception the sign of all coefficients on
managerial incentive variables is the same in NEU
and NEG.
5. Conclusion
The present paper examines whether, when and
how managers bias the tone of forward-looking
narratives. For that we use techniques of manual
content analysis and we focus on the annual report
outlook section, a paragraph of forward-looking
statements that is typically located at the end of the
Chairman’s Statement. For each forward-looking
statement we determine the tone of the underlying
message and we aggregate positive, neutral and
negative statements into an overall measure of tone.
Our findings suggest that firms with an impend-
ing performance decline bias the tone in the outlook
section upwards and this finding is consistent with
earlier work on backward-looking narratives. In
addition, we find that the tone in the outlook section
responds to a number of managerial incentive
variables that are unrelated to the private signal
about future trading. In particular, we find that loss
firms, risky firms and firms with an analyst earnings
forecast provide a more positive tone, while firms
with a contemporaneous earnings decline provide a
more negative tone. These four observations are
difficult to reconcile with signalling models, but
they are consistent with impression management.
Perhaps the single most interesting finding of our
study is the observation that a biased tone is not
achieved primarily by changing the number of
positive statements. Indeed for a majority of our
managerial incentive variables the main vehicle of
managing the tone is to change the number of
negative statements. This has two implications.
First, it demonstrates that the conventional wisdom
of bad news being more reliable than good news is
not justified. Second, when coupled with the
observation that negative statements trigger larger
price revisions than positive statements (e.g. Hutton
et al., 2003) this finding suggests a possible
interaction effect between value-relevance and
impression management. In particular, it suggests
that impression management targets those outlook
statements most that are known to trigger the largest
price revisions. This would imply that bias and
value-relevance are positively, rather than nega-
tively, correlated with each other. We believe that a
further (and more direct) examination of the link
between value-relevance and impression manage-
ment provides an interesting opportunity for future
research.
Our findings have policy implications. In par-
ticular, while prior research demonstrates that
analysts and investors rely on forward-looking
annual report narratives for decision-making,
these statements remain largely unregulated and
unaudited. In particular, while the Companies Act
2006 now requires quoted companies to include, in
the Directors’ Report, a Business Review which
analyses a firm’s main future trends and factors ‘to
the extent necessary’, the more specific require-
ments on forward-looking narratives in the ASB’s
(2006) reporting statement on the Operating and
Financial Review still remain voluntary. At the
same time our results indicate that market forces
alone are unable to ensure that these narratives are
unbiased and free from impression management.
Thus, our findings demonstrate a need to consider a
more formal review process for forward-looking
statements. For example, auditors could check the
outlook statements against actual performance
during the first quarter, the firm’s annual budgets,
and existing orders and enquiries.
References
ASB (1993).Operating and Financial Review. London: The
Accounting Standards Board.
ASB (2006). Reporting Statement: Operating and Financial
Review. London: The Accounting Standards Board.
APB (2004). International Standard on Auditing (UK and
Ireland) 720 (revised). Section A – Other information in
documents containing audited financial statements.
London: The Auditing Practices Board.
Beattie, V.A. and Jones, M.J. (1992). ‘The use and abuse of
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 21/7/2010 04 ABR Schleicher.3d Page 388 of 390
388 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:23
 03
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
graphs in annual reports: a theoretical framework and
empirical study’. Accounting and Business Research, 22:
297–305.
Bettman, J.R. and Weitz, B.A. (1983). ‘Attributions in the
board room: causal reasoning in corporate annual reports’.
Administrative Science Quarterly, June: 165–183.
Brennan, N. (1999). ‘Voluntary disclosure of profit forecasts
by target companies in takeover bids’. Journal of Business
Finance and Accounting, 26: 883–917.
Brennan, N.M., Guillamon-Saorin, E. and Pierce, A. (2008).
‘Impression management: developing and illustrating a
scheme of analysis for narrative disclosures – a methodo-
logical note’. Working Paper, University College Dublin.
Bryan, S. (1997). ‘Incremental information content of
required disclosures contained in management discussion
and analysis’. Accounting Review, 72: 285–301.
Citron, D.B., Taffler, R.J. and Uang, J.-Y. (2008). ‘Delays in
reporting price-sensitive information: the case of going
concern’. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 27: 19–
37.
Clarkson, P.M., Kao, J.L. and Richardson, G.D. (1999).
‘Evidence that management discussion and analysis
(MD&A) is a part of a firm’s overall disclosure package’.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 16: 111–134.
Clatworthy, M.A. and Jones, M.J. (2001). ‘The effect of
thematic structure on the variability of annual report
readability’. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Journal, 14(3): 311–326.
Clatworthy, M. and Jones, M.J. (2003). ‘Financial reporting
of good news and bad news: evidence from accounting
narratives’. Accounting and Business Research, 33: 171–
185.
Courtis, J.A. (2004). ‘Corporate report obfuscation: artefact
or phenomenon?’. British Accounting Review, 36: 291–
312.
Dye, R.A. (1985). ‘Disclosure of non-proprietary informa-
tion’. Journal of Accounting Research, 23: 123–145.
Graham, J., Harvey, C. and Rajgopal, S. (2005). ‘The
economic implications of corporate financial reporting’.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40: 3–37.
Grossman, S.J. (1981). ‘The informational role of warranties
and private disclosure about product quality’. Journal of
Law and Economics, 24: 461–483.
Guillamon-Saorin, E. (2006). ‘Impression management in
financial reporting: evidence from the UK and Spain’.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University College
Dublin.
Henry, E. (2008). ‘Are investors influenced by how earnings
press releases are written?’. Journal of Business
Communication, 45: 363–407.
Huber, P.J. (1973). ‘Robust regression: asymptotics, con-
jectures, and Monte Carlo’. Annals of Statistics, 1: 799–
821.
Hughes, P.J. and Sankar, M.R. (1997). ‘The impact of
litigation risk on discretionary disclosure’. Working paper,
University of California, Los Angeles.
Hussainey, K., Schleicher, T. and Walker, M. (2003).
‘Undertaking large-scale disclosure studies when AIMR-
FAF ratings are not available: the case of prices leading
earnings’. Accounting and Business Research, 33: 275–
294.
Hutton, A., Miller, G.S. and Skinner, D.J. (2003). ‘The role
of supplementary statements with management earnings
forecasts’. Journal of Accounting Research, 41: 867–890.
Jelic, R., Saadouni, B. and Briston, R. (1998). ‘The accuracy
of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses on the Kuala
Lumpur stock exchange’. Accounting and Business
Research, 29: 57–72.
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). ‘Theory of the
firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership
structure’. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–360.
Johnson, W.B. and Schwartz, W.C. (2005). ‘Are investors
misled by ‘‘pro forma’’ earnings?’. Contemporary
Accounting Research, 22: 915–963.
Jung, W. and Kwon, Y.K. (1988). ‘Disclosure when the
market is unsure of information endowment of managers’.
Journal of Accounting Research, 26: 146–153.
Kasznik, R. and Lev, B. (1995). ‘To warn or not to warn:
management disclosures in the face of an earnings
surprise’. Accounting Review, 70: 113–134.
Krippendorff, K. (1980). Content Analysis. London: Sage.
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R. (1996). ‘Corporate disclosure
policy and analyst behavior’. Accounting Review, 71: 467–
492.
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R. (2000). ‘Voluntary disclosure
and equity offerings: reducing information asymmetry or
hyping the stock?’. Contemporary Accounting Research,
17: 623–662.
Matsunaga, S. and Park, C. (2001). ‘The effect of missing a
quarterly earnings benchmark on the CEO’s annual bonus’.
Accounting Review, 76: 313–332.
Matsumoto, D. (2002). ‘Management’s incentives to avoid
negative earnings surprises’. Accounting Review, 77: 483–
514.
McConomy, B.J. (1998). ‘Bias and accuracy of management
earnings forecasts: an evaluation of the impact of auditing’.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 15: 167–195.
McNichols, M. (1989). ‘Evidence of information asymme-
tries from management earnings forecasts and stock
return’. Accounting Review, 64: 1–27.
Merkl-Davies, D.M. and Brennan, N.M. (2007).
‘Discretionary disclosure strategies in corporate narratives:
incremental information or impression management?’.
Journal of Accounting Literature, 26: 116–194.
Milgrom, P.R. (1981). ‘Good news and bad news: represen-
tation theorems and applications’. Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science, 12: 380–391.
Miller, G.S. (2002). ‘Earnings performance and discretion-
ary disclosure’. Journal of Accounting Research, 40: 173–
204.
Milne, M.J. and Adler, R.A. (1999). ‘Exploring the reliabil-
ity of social and environmental disclosures content analy-
sis’. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 12:
237–256.
Palepu, K.G., Healy, P.M. and Bernard, V.L. (2003),
Business Analysis & Valuation (3rd edn). South Western:
Mason.
Puffer, S. and Weintrop, J. (1991). ‘Corporate performance
and CEO turnover: the role of performance expectations’.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 1–19.
Richardson, S., Teoh, S. and Wysocki, P. (2004). ‘The
walkdown of beatable analyst forecasts: the roles of equity
issuance and insider trading incentives’. Contemporary
Accounting Research, 21(4): 885–924.
Rogers, J.L. and Stocken, P.C. (2005). ‘Credibility of
management forecasts’. Accounting Review, 80: 1233–
1260.
Roychowdhury, S. (2006). ‘Earnings management through
real activities manipulation’. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 42: 335–370.
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 21/7/2010 04 ABR Schleicher.3d Page 389 of 390
Vol. 40, No. 4. 2010 389
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:23
 03
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
Rutherford, B.A. (2005). ‘Genre analysis of corporate annual
report narratives: a corpus linguistics based approach’.
Journal of Business Communication, 42: 324–348.
Schleicher, T., Hussainey, K. and Walker, M. (2007). ‘Loss
firms’ annual report narratives and share price anticipation
of earnings’. British Accounting Review, 39: 153–171.
Schleicher, T. and Walker, M. (1999). ‘Share price antici-
pation of earnings and management’s discussion of oper-
ations and financing’. Accounting and Business Research,
29: 321–335.
Schrand, C. and Walther, B.R. (2000). ‘Strategic bench-
marks in earnings announcements: the selective disclosure
of prior-period earnings components’. Accounting Review,
75: 151–177.
Skinner, D.J. (1994). ‘Why firms voluntarily disclose bad
news’. Journal of Accounting Research, 32: 38–60.
Smith, M. and Taffler, R. (2000). ‘The chairman’s statement:
a content analysis of discretionary narrative disclosures’.
Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal, 13: 624–
646.
Trueman, B. (1997). ‘Managerial disclosures and share-
holder litigation’. Review of Accounting Studies, 1: 181–
199.
Verrecchia, R.E. (1983). ‘Discretionary disclosure’. Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 5: 179–194.
Walker, M. (1997). ‘The economics of corporate financial
communication’. ACCAOccasionalWorkingPaperNo. 19.
Walker, M. and Louvari, E. (2003). ‘The determinants of
voluntary disclosure of adjusted earnings per share meas-
ures by UK quoted companies’. Accounting and Business
Research, 33: 295–309.
Weber, R.P. (1990). Basic Content Analysis (2nd edn).
London: Sage.
Yohai, V.J. (1987). ‘High breakdown point and high
efficiency robust estimates for regression’. Annals of
Statistics, 15: 642–656.
Yuthas, K., Rogers, R. and Dillard, J.F. (2002).
‘Communicative action and corporate annual reports’.
Journal of Business Ethics, 41: 141–157.
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 21/7/2010 04 ABR Schleicher.3d Page 390 of 390
390 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:23
 03
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
